APPOINTMENTS AND ILLEGAL ADJUDICATION: THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL LENS

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INTRODUCTION

In 2011, Congress enacted the America Invents Act (“AIA”),¹ in part to provide more effective mechanisms for invalidating, or cancelling, already-issued patents. Patents always can be invalidated by courts in infringement actions if the court determines that the patent is legally deficient.² The debated question, however, has long been whether and how patents can be invalidated or cancelled through administrative rather than judicial proceedings. Building on mechanisms first put into place by statute in 1980,³ the AIA creates a number of new mechanisms for executive department review and cancellation of patents.

The mechanism on which this Article focuses is inter partes review. Inter partes reviews allow panels of the newly created Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”)⁴ to determine, upon appropriate application by third parties, whether previously issued patents should have been issued—either at all or in the form in which they were issued.⁵ This Article leaves it to others

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² See Paul R. Gugliuzza, (Invalid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 279 (2016) (discussing circumstances in which a court might find a patent valid or invalid). Technically, a court in such a case does not “invalidate” the patent—no more than a court that finds a statute unconstitutional “invalidates” the statute. The court, in both cases, simply does not give legal effect to a particular instrument when determining the parties’ legal rights in a specific dispute. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 944 (2018). But if the court decision has estoppel effects, see Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), nothing other than a modest measure of clarity is lost by describing the court decision as “invalidating” or “cancelling” the unlawful patent.
⁵ See id. §§ 311–19.
who actually know the subject to describe the details of the *inter partes* review process and to assess its consequences and wisdom. The sole topic addressed here is whether the procedure for *inter partes* review in the AIA is constitutional. One version of that question recently reached the United States Supreme Court in *Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC*, which upheld the statute against claims that it violated Article III of the Constitution and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. But the case (and the parties) did not address the most fundamental constitutional issues posed by the AIA. The task here is to address them.

Per Title 35 of the United States Code, the PTAB consists of (1) the Director (a.k.a the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office); (2) the Deputy Director; (3) the Commissioner for Patents; (4) the Commissioner for Trademarks; and (5) the administrative patent judges. The administrative patent judges “shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed by the Secretary [of Commerce], in consultation with the Director.” In constitutional terms, the administrative patent judges are appointed in a manner appropriate for inferior officers of the United States, because the Secretary of Commerce who appoints them is a “Head[].” As with the administrative patent judges, the Deputy Director and the two Commissioners are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. The Director, by contrast, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The end result is that only one of the

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8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).

9 Id. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).


11 Id.

12 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). The administrative patent judges are appointed in this manner only because Professor John Duffy identified and highlighted a constitutional infirmity in the appointment process for their predecessors on the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See John F. Duffy, *Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?*, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 904–05 (2009).


14 See id. § 3(a)(1).
members of the PTAB is appointed in a manner constitutionally appropriate for principal officers\textsuperscript{15} of the United States.

The PTAB’s role includes conducting \textit{inter partes} review proceedings in panels of at least three members.\textsuperscript{16} The potential consequences of that role are set out by statute very clearly:

(a) \textsc{Final Written Decision}.—If an \textit{inter partes} review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the [PTAB] shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under section 316(d).

(b) \textsc{Certificate}.—If the [PTAB] issues a final written decision under subsection (a) and the time for appeal has expired or any appeal has terminated, the Director shall issue and publish a certificate canceling any claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable, confirming any claim of the patent determined to be patentable, and incorporating in the patent by operation of the certificate any new or amended claim determined to be patentable.\textsuperscript{17}

The italicized language indicates the substantive nature of the PTAB’s authority: the ability to cancel all or part of an existing patent.

This scheme is undoubtedly unconstitutional in at least one respect and probably unconstitutional in another. First, and most obviously, it allows an executive official to deprive a person of his or her vested property right by canceling an already-issued patent. That is a feat that, under the Constitution, can be performed only by a judicial actor in accordance with governing law. The whole concept of due process of law—reflected in the Constitution’s careful allocations of authority among the various federal institutions and then confirmed and clarified in the Fifth Amendment\textsuperscript{18}—limits the ability of legislative and executive officials to deprive persons of life, liberty, or (in this case) property without the intervention of courts and judicial process. As Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell trenchantly observed,

\begin{itemize}
  \item It has been conventional at least since \textit{Buckley v. Valeo}, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam), to describe federal officers who are not inferior for purposes of the Appointments Clause as “principal” officers. While that practice is now too firmly ingrained in both law and scholarship to challenge here, it is potentially misleading. The Appointments Clause does not use the term “principal officer.” The term appears in the Opinions Clause, which says that the President “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Under the Opinions Clause, there is only one “principal” officer in each department. \textit{Id.} It is far from obvious, however, that every officer but one in each executive department is an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause. It is thus a large leap to read the principal/nonprincipal distinction in the Opinions Clause into the noninferior/inferior distinction in the Appointments Clause. But to pursue that matter here would take us too far afield, so this Article, with considerable reluctance, refers to officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate as “principal” officers.
  \item See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(4), 6(c).
  \item \textit{Id.} § 318(a)–(b) (emphasis added). The appeal mentioned in subsection (b) of the statute is an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. \textit{See id.} § 141.
  \item \textit{See U.S. CONST.} amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ”).
\end{itemize}
“due process has from the beginning been bound up with the division of the authority to deprive subjects of life, liberty, or property between independent political institutions.”

Modern due process law—which focuses on the procedures used by executive agents to effect deprivations rather than on the substance of the deprivations and on the identity of the institutions engaging in them—has strayed far from the Constitution’s original meaning. If one understands separation of powers as a substantive principle, the core of due process of law is likewise substantive and not procedural.

Second, to the extent that this executive cancellation authority is somehow valid (and it might be valid with respect to a modest subset of patents), the statute appears to make the PTAB the final executive authority on patent cancellation decisions. If so, then the PTAB members are principal rather than inferior officers under the Constitution, which means they must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate rather than by the Secretary of Commerce. As currently composed, the PTAB is not constitutionally capable of exercising its statutory functions under the AIA.

Part I of this Article develops the first claim, primarily through resorting to first principles of structural constitutionalism but also by drawing on case law analogies between invention patents and land patents. The law regarding land patents proves to be an especially illuminating context for understanding the Constitution’s permissible mechanisms for federal deprivations of vested rights. The goal in this analysis is to explain why the PTAB’s cancellation function cannot be squared with the Constitution’s original meaning. This is a descriptive claim about the relationship between the statute and the original meaning of the Constitution; it is not a prediction of how any particular legal actors will behave. While the Supreme Court in Oil States Energy Services specifically reserved judgment on due process challenges to the AIA, this analysis is not an attempt to assess whether the AIA is consistent with what any particular legal actors (such as Supreme Court Justices and/or their law clerks) have said or will likely say about the Constitution, the patent system, or executive administration more generally. Such case-oriented questions might well be very important. Arguably, they are far more important to any

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20 See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please! The Original Insignificance of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 BYU L. REV. 611, 626 (“[T]he principle of legality, at least in its executive guise, is substantive rather than procedural. It concerns what the ‘executive Power’ can do, not how or by what procedures it can do it.”).

21 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . .”).

22 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (“[W]e address only the precise constitutional challenges that Oil States raised here. . . . Nor has Oil States raised a due process challenge.”).
real-world patentholders than are academic musings about the actual meaning of the Constitution. They simply are not the questions here.23

Part II explains, far more briefly because the point is simpler, why the PTAB members—assuming the validity of their cancellation authority—are principal officers under the Appointments Clause and, therefore, have not been validly appointed to their positions. As a matter of original meaning, an inferior officer must, at a minimum, answer to someone in the executive department other than the President.24 The PTAB cancellations are administratively final.25 They are the last word in the executive department on a matter of federal law. Anyone who has the last word in the executive department on a matter of federal law is, of necessity, a principal officer.26 Because PTAB administrative judges and the three other PTAB members other than the Director are not appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, they cannot perform the cancellation function that the AIA attempts to vest in them. And the Director cannot do it alone because the PTAB must operate in panels of at least three members.27 The only escape from this conclusion is to read into the statute something that does not appear to be there: a residual authority on the part of the Director unilaterally to overturn any decision by a PTAB panel with which the Director disagrees.

Nothing said in this Article bears at all on the wisdom, as a policy matter, of administrative patent cancellations—or even on the wisdom, as a policy matter, of having patents at all.28 Nor, at the risk of tedium, does this Article try to reconcile any of its claims with case law, past or present. This Article simply points out that one cannot simultaneously embrace both the

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23. This obviously assumes that the meaning of the Constitution is distinct from pronouncements about that meaning made by any particular actor. This is not the place for an extended discussion of constitutional interpretation, but in brief: The Constitution’s meaning consists of the intentions of a hypothetical author named “We the People,” which are best operationalized by ascertaining the intentions of a hypothetical audience of reasonable readers to whom We the People’s statements are addressed. Those hypothetical intentions are objective (albeit not historically concrete) facts. Any pronouncement about those intentions—whether by a Supreme Court Justice, a President, an academic, or a random citizen—can describe the relevant facts accurately or inaccurately. The pronouncer’s title has no bearing on the pronouncement’s accuracy. See generally Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016) (describing the foundations for this account of meaning).


27. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c).

28. Indeed, the author confesses to a standard libertarian suspicion of patents, see Gary Lawson, Truth, Justice, and the Libertarian Way(s), 91 B.U. L. REV. 1347, 1354–56 (2011), but it is not something to which he has devoted very much thought.
PTAB and the Constitution.\textsuperscript{29} It does not argue which one is the better companion.\textsuperscript{30}

I. ILLEGAL ADJUDICATION

A. Huge Tracts o’ Land”: A Primer on Land Patents

Forget invention patents for a moment and think about a different kind of legal instrument that also bears the label “patent”: land patents granted by the United States government. The law and history of land patents have much to teach us about the constitutionality of the AIA.

At one point or another, the U.S. government has owned three-quarters of the country’s land mass.\textsuperscript{31} That is because (except for Texas and Hawaii, which joined the union through direct annexation of previously independent nations) all land beyond the confines of the original thirteen colonies-turned-nations-turned-states was acquired through various acts of the federal government.\textsuperscript{32} Such acquisitions ranged from acceptance of land cessions from the original states (both before and after ratification of the Constitution) to purchase, discovery, and conquest.\textsuperscript{33}

As a landowner of almost unimaginable scope and size, the federal government has long had to figure out what to do with all that land. Some of it has been given to states, either upon admission to the union or as cessions...
after admission.\textsuperscript{34} Much of it has been transferred from the federal government to private ownership.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, the original rationale for ceding land to the national authority was to allow that land to be sold to pay off the Confederation’s debts.\textsuperscript{36} Much of the acquired territory was already validly owned by private actors as a result of grants from previous European sovereign owners.\textsuperscript{37} And much of it remains in federal ownership, awaiting potential future disposition.\textsuperscript{38} To sort out all the various title claims and effectively pursue federal policies, the federal government has always needed some mechanism for verifying and transferring titles to land within the federal domain.

Accordingly, federal land offices—after 1849 under the auspices of the Department of the Interior—have long been in the business of confirming and transferring land titles.\textsuperscript{39} The prize in the crackerjack box for a would-be owner is a \textit{land patent}: a deed representing title to formerly federal land that is recognized as valid by the issuing sovereign authority.\textsuperscript{40} The U.S. government, through several incarnations of this administrative machinery, has issued millions of land patents over the course of more than two centuries.\textsuperscript{41}

Any enterprise of that size is going to make mistakes. This was particularly evident in the early years of the nation, when surveys were often indeterminate and conflicting.\textsuperscript{42} Whether through uncertainty, factual mistake, legal error, or outright fraud, it was (and is) inevitable that some land patents will emerge from this process that are just flat-out illegal. The formal holder of the patent never should have gotten it. The human beings responsible for granting the patent erred. Are those errors correctible?

As a matter of both legal theory and justice, the answer must be yes. The question is not whether, but how, and by whom, those corrections are made.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} See Gates, supra note 31, at 285–340. Some of those cessions from states, such as the cession of the Northwest Territory, occurred prior to ratification of the Constitution. Others, such as cessions from North Carolina and Georgia, happened after ratification. See Act of April 2, 1790, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 106–09 (accepting cession from North Carolina); Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 50, § 10, 2 Stat. 70 (authorizing acceptance of cession from Georgia).
\item \textsuperscript{35} See ANDRO LINKLATER, MEASURING AMERICA: HOW AN UNTAMED WILDERNESS SHAPED THE UNITED STATES AND FULLFILLED THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY 175 (2002) ("[B]y the end of the nineteenth century more than a quarter of a billion acres of public domain had been converted into private property.").
\item \textsuperscript{37} See, e.g., United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86–87 (1833).
\item \textsuperscript{40} See Patent (2), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{42} See LINKLATER, supra note 35, at 150–51 (describing some problems with founding-era surveys).
\end{itemize}
B. Patent Cancellation and Separation of Powers

Federal governmental actors are agents and must act within the scope of their authority.\(^{43}\) If a statute says to issue a land patent only if \(X, Y,\) and \(Z\) are true, and a land office employee issues a document based on \(X, Y,\) and \(\text{not-}Z,\) the employee has behaved unlawfully, and the action has no legal force. Additionally, if the piece of paper erroneously called a land patent is a forgery, or was unlawfully issued or procured, it conveys no durable legal right. Nevertheless, actors within the legal system will treat it as validly conferring rights until they have reason otherwise. To maintain the integrity of a system of recorded land titles, and for property rights to serve the function of providing reliable notice to owners and nonowners of the legal scope of their individual sovereignty, land patents must be treated as presumptively granting valid legal rights.\(^{44}\) Despite this presumption, there must also be some legal mechanism for correcting land office errors. There must, in other words, be some mechanism for formally cancelling land patents that were unlawfully issued. Such has it always been, and such will it ever be.

The big question is: \(\text{Who}\) decides, as a formal legal matter, whether an already-issued land patent was unlawfully issued and is therefore subject to cancellation? Congress? The federal courts? The President? The land office? The land office is the body that issued the land patent in the first place. Is the land office also the body that determines whether issued patents were mistakes and then cancels them? Can Congress cancel land patents, without effecting a taking of private property and paying just compensation,\(^{45}\) through direct legislation? Or is cancellation of such instruments perhaps the exclusive province of the federal courts established pursuant to Article III?

From a constitutional standpoint, the answer to this question of institutional authority is pretty obvious. But the path to that obvious answer is worth taking. Doing so illuminates answers to other questions, including questions involving matters other than the public lands, whose answers are not so obvious—or at least do not always seem to be obvious to twenty-first-century observers (and legislators) who are not accustomed to thinking about the original constitutional structure.

The Constitution does not empower a unitary national government. The Constitution does not contain any clauses that grant power to a single entity called “the United States” or the “national government” or any other

\(^{43}\) For a book-length defense of this claim, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 29.

\(^{44}\) See United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525, 535 (1864) (“A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive as against the Government, and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal.”).

\(^{45}\) If the federal government has a power of eminent domain, then any exercise of that power will “cancel” the prior property right. This Article deals solely with attempts to cancel property rights without just compensation.
Instead, it creates a set of discrete institutions that operate under the umbrella of a corporate governmental entity, \(^{47}\) which collectively can be described as “the federal government,” and it then grants various powers to those discrete institutions. Each empowered institution thus plays a distinct role in the overall organizational structure of the entity known as the United States.

The Congress, for example, is vested with “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted.”\(^{48}\) Those “herein grants” include such things as the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”\(^{49}\) and the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”\(^{50}\) Congress’s constitutional role is to fix the norms of conduct within the spheres of its granted authority, such as the norms regarding disposition of public lands. The President is vested with the “executive Power,”\(^{51}\) which is quintessentially the power to carry preexisting legal norms into effect. Specific decisions by executive agents in the federal land office to issue (or not issue) land patents pursuant to congressional directives establishing the criteria for such grants is a good example of “executive Power” in action. Lastly, the federal courts—the Supreme Court created by the Constitution itself and such additional “inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”\(^{52}\)—are vested with the “judicial Power of the United States.”\(^{53}\) Each governmental institution has distinct granted

\(^{46}\) The one possible exception is the Guarantee Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”). The provision reads like a duty rather than a grant of power, but perhaps someone could find in it an implied power to do whatever is needed to effectuate the guarantee, and in such a case the power could be thought to be vested in the United States as a whole rather than in any particular institution. This seems strained, but it is a possibility worth mentioning for completeness.

\(^{47}\) For an explication of why and how the United States is a corporate body, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 63–75. The corporate status of the United States does confer upon it, as a unitary body, certain powers that are incidental to that status, such as the power to sue and be sued, to hold property, and to make contracts. See id. at 65; Republica v. Sweers, 1 Dall. 41, 44 (Pa. 1779) (holding, rightly or wrongly, that the United States was a corporate entity capable of contracting even prior to ratification of the Articles of Confederation); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1056–57 (2014). It remains true, however, that all the specific power grants enumerated in the Constitution are to particular institutions rather than to a unitary United States.

\(^{48}\) U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.

\(^{49}\) Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

\(^{50}\) Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

\(^{51}\) Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

\(^{52}\) Id. art. III, § 1.

\(^{53}\) Id.
powers, representing each institution’s distinct role in the Constitution’s organizational structure.

The Constitution nowhere defines the precise meaning and scope of “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial” powers, no more than did the many state constitutions of the founding era that similarly divided power among institutions. Some state constitutions contained express “separation of powers” clauses, making clear that different functions were assigned to the recipients of each of the named powers.\footnote{54} It was well understood in the founding era that there were fuzzy boundaries on the margins of these different powers that, as James Madison colorfully put it, “puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.”\footnote{55} But it was also well understood in the founding era that there was a core of meaning to “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial” powers that was part of the common vocabulary of the legal world:

That adept-puzzling obscurity . . . did not stop Madison from categorically declaring that various powers of government are “in their nature . . . legislative, executive, or judiciary.” Nor did it stop John Adams from stating that the “three branches of power have an unalterable foundation in nature; that they exist in every society natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative and executive authorities are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws depend entirely on a separation of them in the frame of government.” . . . Nor did it prevent the United States Constitution from basing its entire scheme of governance on the distinctions between those powers. However difficult it may be at the margins to distinguish the categories of power from each other, the founding generation assumed that there was a fact of the matter about those distinctions and that one could discern that fact in at least a large range of cases. The communicative meaning of the Constitution of 1788 cannot be ascertained without reference to some such distinction, even if legal scholars or political scientists (adept or otherwise) find the distinction unhelpful or confusing.\footnote{56}

That core of meaning dictates that patent cancellation requires action by an Article III federal court.

C. Cancellation and the “Judicial Power”

The “essence” of the judicial power is to decide particular cases in accordance with governing law.\footnote{57} To be sure, there are instances in which the executive power and legislative power can be exercised in a fashion that also fits this description. When executive agents in the land office decide to issue (or not issue) a land patent, they are deciding a particular case in accordance with governing law. When Congress decides matters ranging from private bills to impeachment determinations, it is deciding particular cases in accordance with governing law. There are even specific functions, such as the determination of benefits under a statute, which in principle could be performed

\footnote{54} See Lawson & Seidman, \textit{supra} note 29, at 111–12.
\footnote{55} The Federalist No. 37 (James Madison).
\footnote{56} Lawson, \textit{supra} note 20, at 623–24 (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
\footnote{57} See id. at 624.
under the aegis of any of the three powers. The constitutional rule is that institutions can exercise only those powers with which they are vested, not that every possible governmental function must be uniquely assigned to one specific institution or power. Some functions might overlap across more than one constitutionally vested power.

Having said all of that, however, there are certain kinds of cases that can be decided only through an exercise of the judicial power. A criminal defendant cannot be found guilty by either executive determination or congressional fiat. Adjudications of guilt in criminal trials must be accomplished through exercise of the judicial power.

Where in the Constitution does it state this expressly? Nowhere—because it did not need to be stated expressly. The Jury Clause of Article III, for example, does not specifically say that judges must preside over criminal trials. It says that there must be “Trial . . . by Jury,” but it does not say that trials cannot be conducted by executive or legislative agents. (The location of the provision in Article III is suggestive but not conclusive of that result.) We know that trials must be conducted by judges because we know that that is just part of what the “judicial Power” encompasses and is not part of what “executive Power” or “legislative Power[]” encompass. Everybody knows—across the span of more than two centuries—that neither the legislative nor the executive power includes the power to preside over a criminal trial or determine criminal guilt, at least outside some very specialized circumstances that bring a unilateral power of criminal imprisonment within the executive or legislative powers. That is just not what those powers are about.

The closest thing in the Constitution to an articulation of this basic principle is found in the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which says that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” As with almost everything in the Bill of Rights,

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60 See id.
61 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
62 Id.
63 Id. § 1.
64 The executive can permissibly imprison people on criminal charges in occupied foreign territory during wartime, pursuant to executive-promulgated norms for governance of the occupied territory, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 151, but that does not extend to actions against American subjects. Military discipline can involve a form of imprisonment, but that is distinct from ordinary criminal proceedings and can be justified on grounds of waiver when people enlist in the military. (What about draftees? The draft is spectacularly unconstitutional, but that is a story for another time.) Venerable Supreme Court precedent permits Congress to imprison people in defense of the order of the legislative chamber. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 232–33 (1821). That is a dubious conclusion. See Gary Lawson, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1373, 1384–85 (2005).
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
this provision merely clarified principles that were already immanent in the Constitution of 1788; it added very little to the actual legal meaning of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{66} But one of the clarifications is very important, because it clarifies the range of subjects over which only the federal courts can conduct constitutionally proper adjudications: no one may be deprived of (a) life, (b) liberty, or (c) property, “without due process of law.”

This restriction rules out unilateral executive action that effects a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The most basic principle of due process of law is that executive (and judicial) action can take place only in accordance with law, meaning that there must be law—constitutional, statutory, or general—for the executive to enforce to effect a valid deprivation of life, liberty, or property.\textsuperscript{67} This has been the main point of the idea of due process of law since before the term “due process of law” was ever coined.\textsuperscript{68}

It also rules out direct legislative determination of rights to life, liberty, and property. Professors Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. M. McConnell’s magisterial study of the relationship between due process of law and separation of powers before the middle of the nineteenth century makes clear that founding-era legislatures were not supposed to adjudicate specific rights, such as rights to property.\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, this strict separation of legislative and judicial functions was one of the great innovations of founding-era constitutionalism, and it had a fundamental place in the post–Revolutionary American tradition of due process of law.\textsuperscript{70} Legislatures are supposed to pass general norms of conduct, not decide specific disputes.\textsuperscript{71} So neither the executive nor the legislature is the right body to decide the validity of a property title.

But what about the two put together? What if the legislature authorizes the executive to adjudicate the title? If Congress creates law saying that executive agents can unilaterally deprive people of rights—say, by cancelling already-issued patents—does that solve the due process of law problem by providing the law the executive needs to act?

It solves one problem and creates another. Such authorization will work if but only if Congress has the constitutional power to create that authorization; otherwise, there is no valid law for the executive to execute. No such general authority exists in the Constitution to permit Congress to allow executive deprivations of rights (or to effect the deprivations directly through

\textsuperscript{66} This proposition is explained and defended at great length in Lawson, supra note 20, at 613–14.

\textsuperscript{67} Id. at 634.

\textsuperscript{68} See id. at 621–22.

\textsuperscript{69} Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1738–39, 1755.

\textsuperscript{70} For a pellucid description of how this separation, and the accompanying notion that legislatures could not interfere with vested private rights, developed in a very short time in the founding era, see generally Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421 (1999).

\textsuperscript{71} That is true, of course, only when a subject’s life, liberty, or property is at stake. Private bills are fine, because they concern benefits, not rights. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1734.
legislation). The only conceivable source of such power would be the Necessary and Proper Clause, which allows Congress to pass laws “which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”\(^{72}\) the various constitutionally vested powers. That clause, however, reflects and incorporates basic ideas of separation of powers. Not everything that Congress enacts is in fact “necessary and proper” for carrying into execution federal powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a vehicle for recognizing the incidental powers of Congress;\(^{73}\) it is not a license to undo the scheme of separated powers.\(^{74}\) The trick is to figure out precisely what Congress can and cannot do by way of authorizing or effecting deprivations of life, liberty, or property.

Go back to land patents. The federal government does not have to grant land patents to private citizens. At any given moment, the government could just sit on the federal domain. Absent a valid congressional statute, no specific individual has a legal right to have any specific federal lands granted to him or her, no more than, absent a valid congressional statute, any individual military veteran has a right to a pension. The granting of land patents or military pensions is within Congress’s discretion.\(^{75}\)

Once the decision has been made to grant patents or pensions, and the appropriate statutes have been enacted, Congress can entrust enforcement of those statutes either to executive or judicial agents. That is, Congress could establish a direct private right of action to enforce in court statutes specifying criteria for land grants or pensions and leave it to the judicial process to determine whether those criteria are met. Alternatively, Congress could create an administrative—that is, an executive—body to make those determinations (all under the supervision of the President under the theory of the unitary executive). Committing those decisions to administrative determination does not violate the idea of due process of law because no one, including any disappointed applicant, is being deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by an unfavorable determination.\(^{76}\) An expectation of government benefits—things that the government does not have to give you—is not constitutional

\(^{72}\) U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.


\(^{74}\) The author of this Article has spent much of his life defending this claim. For where it all began, see generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). He would revise some of the analysis in that article today, see, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 79–81, thanks primarily to the pioneering work of Professor Robert G. Natelson, see, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Property Clause, in LAWSON, MILLER, NATELSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 73, at 57, but the basic argument about separation-of-powers limits to Congress’s incidental powers still (he thinks) holds up pretty well.

\(^{75}\) See supra Part I.A.

\(^{76}\) The Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided deciding whether applicants for government benefits have due process rights. E.g., Am. Mfs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 61 n.13 (1999); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986). As an original matter, however, the answer is pretty clearly “no.”
“property.” This was perfectly obvious until the 1960s. The now-much-maligned distinction between rights and privileges in the context of government benefits is obviously correct as a matter of original constitutional meaning. Does anyone really, truly think otherwise?

Matters are very different, however, once a land patent or pension check has been issued. At that point, the recipient has bona fide constitutional property in his or her hands. In eighteenth-century lingo, the person now has a vested right. To get the vested property out of his or her hands requires due process of law. More specifically, it requires judicial process. Mere executive determinations, even executive determinations authorized by statute, that the patent or pension was wrongly issued are not enough. Why? Because, at that point, the holder of the patent or pension has a vested property right. A mere expectation of a benefit has become a tangible interest; the quantum field, so to speak, has collapsed.

“But,” says the government, “you don’t really have a property right. All you have is a piece of paper that says that you have a property right, but the paper is invalid, and thus so is your purported right.” That is a perfectly legitimate thing for the government—or a private citizen asserting a superior claim—to say. It might even be correct in any specific case. The real question is who gets to decide whether it is correct or just hot gas. Can Congress determine that executive agents get to make that call? Can Congress make that call itself?

No and no. Congress can (and must) prescribe the norms that govern the disposition of the public lands, because Congress is vested with all the relevant “legislative Powers.” Executive agents then implement those norms; that is what “executive Power” is all about. But the determination of private

77 See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
78 See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.8 (1972) (disapproving of Bailey and noting that “the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights”).
80 Can Congress condition receipt of a benefit or privilege on forfeiture of other rights? That raises the long-unsettled “unconstitutional conditions” problem, and this is hardly the place to try to settle it. The short answer is that any conditions must be “necessary and proper” for executing federal powers, which at a minimum requires that those conditions be justified by reference to fiduciary principles. That rules out most of the parade of horribles that one might imagine.
81 For illuminating discussions of the nature and role of vested rights in the founding era, see generally Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1737–38, 1755–64; Nelson, supra note 59; and Wood, supra note 70.
82 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1719 (“[T]he separation-of-powers notion that the power to make laws—the power to ‘legislate’—is the power to establish general rules for the future, not to determine specific applications of law or to punish past acts.”); Nelson, supra note 59, at 577–81; Lawson, supra note 20, at 622.
rights is what the “judicial Power” is all about. How do we know this? Where does the Constitution say so? We know it because that is just what terms like legislative, executive, and judicial power meant in 1788.\textsuperscript{83} We know it because of a millennium-long tradition of “due process of law” that limited both legislative and executive adjudication of private rights, especially vested property rights. This is all explored at length elsewhere,\textsuperscript{84} but it really requires an act of willful blindness to avoid it. The whole point of dividing governmental power among discrete institutions is to create distinct roles for each actor and preserve liberty in the process. The heart and soul of the judicial role is the adjudication of private rights. There are reasons why the Constitution gave the President “executive” but not “judicial” power and gave the Congress various “legislative” but not “judicial” powers. The Constitution did not define the precise contours of those powers because it assumed that readers would try to read the document honestly and that any honest reader would know darned well that certain things just had to be done by courts, others by executives, and others by legislatures.

Nineteenth-century courts that faced exactly this issue relating to land patents got it exactly right. To be clear, the answers are not right because the nineteenth-century courts reached them. The answers are right because they are objectively right. The point of discussing the cases is only to show how those right answers can be and sometimes have been operationalized.

\textit{United States v. Stone}\textsuperscript{85} is illustrative. A series of treaties with the Delaware tribes vested title to land in the Delawares while reserving a portion of the land to the United States for a military fort.\textsuperscript{86} Much of the Delaware land was then ceded back to the United States by the tribes on the condition that it be surveyed and sold for the benefit of the Delawares.\textsuperscript{87} Various surveys over the course of decades showed inconsistent boundaries between the land given to the Delawares and the land reserved for federal use.\textsuperscript{88} Specifically, an 1860 treaty gave certain Delaware chiefs the right to select for their personal use some of the land held by the United States for the benefit of the Delawares.\textsuperscript{89} The chiefs then assigned those rights to Stone.\textsuperscript{90} One year later in 1861, the Secretary of the Interior determined the boundary between the U.S. military fort and the Delaware lands was slightly north of some of the prior determinations.\textsuperscript{91} Stone selected land within the strip south of the fort that was newly determined to be Delaware lands, and land patents were

\textsuperscript{83} See Nelson, supra note 59, at 565–75.
\textsuperscript{84} See generally Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1727–37; Lawson, supra note 20, at 652–54.
\textsuperscript{85} 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525 (1864).
\textsuperscript{86} Id. at 525, 527.
\textsuperscript{87} Id. at 527–28.
\textsuperscript{88} Id. at 526–28.
\textsuperscript{89} Id. at 528.
\textsuperscript{90} Id. at 525.
\textsuperscript{91} Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 533.
issued to Stone.\textsuperscript{92} Then, in 1862, the Secretary of the Interior reversed course.\textsuperscript{93} The Secretary found that a survey performed under an 1854 treaty had been approved by the President and was thus the official boundary.\textsuperscript{94} Consequently, he determined that this official boundary placed Stone’s land within the federally reserved territory, concluded that the 1861 land patents were unlawfully issued because they purported to convey land that was not held for the benefit of the Delawares, and he cancelled the patents.\textsuperscript{95}

If the Secretary’s cancellation decision was legally effective, one might expect at that point to see Stone sue the United States (or perhaps the Secretary if sovereign immunity would bar a direct action\textsuperscript{96}). That is not what happened. Instead, the United States sued Stone. As the Court explained,

\begin{quote}
[the [land] patents all recited the promises of the treaty of 1860 to grant land to the chiefs, and went on to grant the particular tract, ‘in conformity with the provisions, as above recited, of the aforesaid treaty.’ In 1862, the Secretary of the Interior decided that the patents had been issued without legal authority, and he declared them void and revoked. However,\textit{to proceed rightly}, the United States filed a bill in the Federal court of Kansas, against the Indian chiefs and Stone, to have them judicially decreed null, and the instruments themselves delivered up for cancellation.\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

The Court agreed that a judicial action, rather than an administrative cancellation, was the way “\textit{to proceed rightly}”:

\begin{quote}
Patents are sometimes issued unadvisedly or by mistake, where the officer has no authority in law to grant them, or where another party has a higher equity and should have received the patent. In such cases courts of law will pronounce them void. The patent is but evidence of a grant, and the officer who issues it acts ministerially and not judicially. If he issues a patent for land reserved from sale by law, such patent is void for want of authority. But one officer of the land office is not competent to cancel or annul the act of his predecessor. That is a judicial act, and requires the judgment of a court.\textsuperscript{98}
\end{quote}

To be sure, one cannot describe this statement as a holding, because it was not actually in controversy. No one disputed it, because it was too obvious for dispute. Counsel for the United States explained: “Plainly, too, the appropriate remedy of the United States, to set aside and cancel patents issued by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92} Id. at 528.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{94} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{95} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{97} \textit{Stone}, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 528 (second emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{98} Id. at 535.
\end{itemize}
her officers, without due legal authority, is by bill in equity." No one argued that a mere administrator, even one with Cabinet status, could cancel an already-issued land patent. Everybody knew that only a court could do that.

This conclusion was confirmed, clarified, and strengthened slightly more than a decade later in Moore v. Robbins. The case was a dispute between Moore and Davis, who were purchasers at a federal land auction, and Robbins, who asserted a claim under a mortgage executed by someone who asserted statutory preemptive rights to the same land. The land office initially ruled in favor of the priority of the preemption right, but the commissioner found otherwise and accordingly issued a land patent to Moore. The Secretary of the Interior disagreed and sought to cancel—the issued patent. The holder of the federal patent, Moore, refused to relinquish it. In the ensuing foreclosure action, Moore and Davis were brought in as defendants to quiet the mortgagee’s title.

The Illinois Supreme Court considered itself bound by the last determination of the land office, which was the Secretary of the Interior’s decision in favor of the preemptive rights (and hence of the mortgagee claiming under them). The U.S. Supreme Court strongly disagreed:

While conceding for the present, to the fullest extent, that when there is a question of contested right between private parties to receive from the United States a patent for any part of the public land, it belongs to the head of the Land Department to decide that question, it is equally clear that when the patent has been awarded to one of the contestants, and has been issued, delivered, and accepted, all right to control the title or to decide on the right to the title has passed from the land-office. Not only has it passed from the land-office, but it has passed from the Executive Department of the government. . . . If . . . the patent issued under the seal of the United States, and signed by the President, is delivered to and accepted by the party, the title of the government passes with this delivery. With the title passes away all authority or control of the Executive Department over the land, and over the title which it has conveyed. It would be as reasonable to hold that any private owner of land who has conveyed it to another can, of his own volition, recall, cancel, or annul the instrument which he has made and delivered. If fraud, mistake, error, or wrong has been done, the courts of justice present the only remedy.

And again:

99 Id. at 532.
100 96 U.S. 530 (1878).
101 Id. at 530–31, 539.
102 Davis, the other purchaser, did not actually receive his patent from the land office, and his case accordingly required a different analysis. See id. at 534–35. The Court ruled in Davis’s favor because of the failure of the preemptive claimant to perfect his claim. See id. at 538–39.
103 Id. at 531.
104 Id.
105 The facts of the case are set out most fully and clearly in the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. See Robbins v. Bunn, 54 Ill. 48, 50 (1870).
106 See id. at 53.
107 Moore, 96 U.S. at 532–33.
The functions of that [executive] department necessarily cease when the title has passed from the government. And the title does so pass in every instance where, under the decisions of the officers having authority in the matter, a conveyance, generally called a patent, has been signed by the President, and sealed, and delivered to and accepted by the grantee. It is a matter of course that, after this is done, neither the secretary nor any other executive officer can entertain an appeal.108

In other words, while the matter is still under the consideration of the executive, no property right has yet vested. The executive agents can change their minds as many times as there are levels of internal appeal. But once the government issues a land patent,109 the claimant has a right to property, and while that right can be challenged and even overturned, cancellation of the patent requires due process of law.110 It requires judicial process.

The only question is whether cancellation of a land patent requires judicial process by constitutional command or simply because of statutory provisions. There is some language in the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Moore that suggests the latter.111 And one can imagine land patent statutes in which government agents are required to issue only defeasible deeds that essentially give the government a right to reclaim the property through administrative fiat. Then there would be no issue of deprivation of a property interest, because the interest itself would expire with the administrative determination. The landholder would essentially receive a tenancy at will. But in a statutory scheme in which land patents for fee simple absolute interests are issued, the issuance of the patent ends the administrative role and triggers a constitutional requirement of judicial process for an ensuing deprivation. The U.S. Supreme Court in Moore said as much.112 After noting the uncertainty of title that would result from allowing administrative reconsideration of patent decisions, the Court did not then say that such power was denied to the land office by statute. Instead, the Court said that “[t]he existence of any such

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108 Id. at 533–34.
109 When exactly does a land patent “issue”? Is physical delivery of the patent necessary for legal issuance? The Supreme Court’s nineteenth-century answer was a resounding “no,” because delivery of a fully executed land patent is a ministerial act that could be compelled by mandamus. See United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 397 (1880) (“[U]pon the decision of the proper office that the citizen has become entitled to a patent for a portion of the public lands, such a patent made out in that office is signed by the President, sealed with the seal of the General Land-Office, countersigned by the recorder of the land-office, and duly recorded in the record-book kept for that purpose, it becomes a solemn public act of the government of the United States, and needs no further delivery or other authentication to make it perfect and valid. In such case the title to the land conveyed passes by matter of record to the grantee, and the delivery which is required when a deed is made by a private individual is not necessary to give effect to the granting clause of the instrument.”). While, as the Court noted, this is contrary to the rules at private law regarding land transfers, there was, one might recall, some modest prior authority for the proposition that delivery of a government document (perhaps a commission as a justice of the peace?) is not strictly necessary for giving legal effect to the document when the act of delivery is ministerial.
112 Moore, 96 U.S. at 534.
power in the Land Department is utterly inconsistent with the universal principle on which the right of private property is founded.”

It is, in other words, inconsistent with the principle of due process of law. Only a court can cancel a land patent.114

What is true for patents of land is also true for patents of inventions. Indeed, the Supreme Court, not long after Moore, recognized the close similarity between land patents and invention patents.115 That similarity became even starker, and the constitutional foundations of cancellation doctrine more conspicuous, in McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman.116

In McCormick, the holder of a patent in a harvesting machine twine binder asked the patent office for reissuance of the patent to include some new claims.117 The examiner determined that some of the original claims were invalid, and no administrative appeal was taken by the patentee to that determination.118 The patentee then brought an infringement action based on the original patent, relying in part on the claims that had been rejected by the reissuance examiner.119 The court of appeals certified to the Supreme Court the question whether the examiner’s actions invalidated—that is, cancelled—the relevant claims in the original patent.120

Under the law developed in the context of land patents, the answer was very clear: Once the original patent issued, as it had in this case, the whole or a part of it could be cancelled only by judicial action, not by unilateral executive action.121 An examiner, a commissioner, a cabinet secretary, the President—regardless of how high up the food chain it went, no executive official could act to deprive someone of property.122 It simply is not the purview of “executive Power” to cancel vested property rights, and patents—for both land and inventions—vest rights immediately when issued.

The Supreme Court, recognizing the linkage between land patents and invention patents, accordingly had an easy time of it, holding precisely that the original patent remained in force until a new one issued to supersede it and that in no event could the patent office cancel any or all of the original

113 Id.
114 To be sure, Congress could pass a statute condemning the land, provide just compensation to the patent holder, and then redisseminate the land from the public domain. From the standpoint of the patent holder, that is much like cancellation, albeit with the not-insignificant addendum that the patent holder receives just compensation. But Congress could not simply pass a statute declaring a land patent invalid. Or, rather, Congress could pass such a statute, but it would have the same legal effect as a proclamation of National Potato Month.
116 169 U.S. 606 (1898).
117 Id. at 607.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 607–08.
121 Id. at 609.
122 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 608–09.
patent by administrative fiat. Because this decision has been the subject of much discussion in recent times, both in the courts of appeals and in the Supreme Court, it is useful to see the Court’s reasoning, including the authorities it cites, at some length:

It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents, and has had affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be revoked or canceled by the President, or any other officer of the Government. [*United States v. Schurz*, 102 U.S. 378 (1880); *United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.*, 128 U. S. 315, 363 (1888)]. It has become the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as other property. [*Seymour v. Osborne*, 78 U.S. 516 (1870); *Cammeyer v. Newton*, 94 U.S. 225 (1876); *United States v. Palmer*, 128 U.S. 262, 271 (1888) (citing *James v. Campbell*, 104 U.S. 356 (1881))].

The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and not in the department which issued the patent. [*Moore v. Robbins*, 96 U. S. 530, 533 (1877); *Am. Bell Tel. Co.*, 128 U. S. at 364; *Michigan Land and Lumber Co. v. Rust*, 168 U. S. 589, 593 (1897)]. And in this respect a patent for an invention stands in the same position and is subject to the same limitations as a patent for a grant of lands. The power to issue either one of these patents comes from Congress and is vested in the same department. In the case of a patent for lands it has been held that when one has obtained a patent from the Government he cannot be called upon to answer in regard to that patent before the officers of the Land Department, and that the only way his title can be impeached is by suit. [*United States v. Stone*, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864); *Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell*, 135 U.S. 286 (1890); *Noble v. Union River Logging R.R.*, 147 U. S. 165 1893)].

Oddly, both a panel of the Federal Circuit and a majority of the Supreme Court have recently concluded that this language referred only to a lack of statutory authority on the part of the patent examiner. Had Congress granted the patent office power to cancel claims in original patents upon receipt of a reissuance request, those courts believe, there would be no constitutional obstacle to such cancellation. The cited authorities, however, make it obvious that this decision was grounded in constitutional concerns, not a mere absence of statutory authority in the patent examiner. Michael Rothwell has performed a detailed, case-by-case analysis of the relevant authorities, and his exhaustive account of each cited decision makes it clear beyond cavil that *McCormick* was grounded in first principles of constitutionalism.

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126 See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1376; MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1289.
127 See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1376; MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1289.
Indeed, how else could one explain the rather straightforward account given by the Court of its own decision?

Had the original patent been procured by fraud or deception it would have been the duty of the Commissioner of Patents to have had the matter referred to the Attorney General with the recommendation that a suit be instituted to cancel the patent; but to attempt to cancel a patent upon an application for reissue when the first patent is considered invalid by the examiner would be to deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the government by the executive.129

For those of us who are interested in original meaning rather than doctrine, what matters is not that McCormick said that there was a constitutional basis for the patent office’s lack of cancellation authority130—or that Oil States said otherwise.131 What matters is that there was a constitutional basis for the patent office’s lack of cancellation authority. Executive officials cannot, under the Constitution, simply make vested rights to life, liberty, or property go away, even if Congress (and a majority of the Supreme Court) says that they can.

Of course, much has happened since the end of the nineteenth century. The modern cases upholding the constitutional validity of executive patent cancellations do not really turn on how best to parse a patent decision from 1898 or the land patent decisions from decades earlier on which it was based. Instead, they focus on case law from the past eight decades systematically upholding administrative actions that adjudicate private vested rights.132 As one scholar aptly, and presciently,133 put it, for purposes of current case law, “[t]rankly, it does not matter what the best reading of McCormick is...[t]he pre-dates the Supreme Court’s modern Article III jurisprudence.”134

That jurisprudence, which clearly allows some private vested rights to be adjudicated by executive officials, goes back at least to 1932, when Crowell v. Benson135 gave a measure of finality to administrative fact-finding in claims for worker’s compensation under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1927 (“LHWCA”). It is less important that the case seemed to reserve to courts the de novo power to determine “jurisdictional” facts essential to the exercise of the agency’s power than that the case roundly affirmed the binding character of agency determination of “non-

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129 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 612.
130 See id. at 608–09.
131 See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1376.
132 E.g., id. at 1374–75.
133 See id. at 1372–76.
135 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
jurisdictional” facts. Not only was this the nose in the camel’s tent (contrast it with the categorical denial of executive power in the nineteenth-century patent cases), but as the distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional facts lost its traction, the power of agencies to determine facts with a measure of finality in disputes involving private rights grew to its present—or, rather, omnipresent—stature. While the modern Supreme Court has drawn some limits on the power of Congress to commit adjudication of private rights to federal administrative agencies, those limits tend to involve state-based common-law claims, which do not include federally grounded patent rights. The majority in Oil States made that point with clarity. Under current doctrine, any federal involvement in the definition or securing of the relevant right seems enough to let the Court slap on the label “public right,” which has the effect of permitting Congress to allow a strong measure of executive determination of those rights. A return to the eighteenth- or nineteenth-century understanding of the role of courts in the adjudication of private rights would be as surprising as a return to the original understanding of the subdelegation doctrine or the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.

The modern doctrine has no connection to original constitutional meaning and is therefore irrelevant to the present Article, which seeks to uncover that original meaning. The modern cases do not remotely purport to ascertain the original meaning of Article II, Article III, the idea of due process of law, or any other constitutional texts and principles that bear on the permissibility of administrative adjudication of private rights. It is sufficient for purposes of this Article to look at the reasoning of perhaps the leading modern case upholding administrative adjudication of private rights: Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.

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136 See id. at 50–54.
137 One must say “a measure of finality,” because in most cases of administrative adjudication, the courts retain some power of appellate review. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 940 (2011). But that review is always with a good dose of deference to the agency, often amounting to affirmance of any agency finding that is supported by “substantial evidence.” See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). Anything short of de novo review deprives private parties of the due process of law represented by judicial determination of their rights.
138 For an intriguing account of how Crowell, which nominally was a 5–3 decision against deference to agency fact-finding, morphed into one of the linchpins of the modern administrative state, see Mark Tushnet, The Story of Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 359 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnick eds. 2010).
141 Id.
The Commodity Exchange Act regulates the practices of commodity brokers and authorizes customers to seek reparations for violation of the statute (or regulations under the statute, which raises its own set of constitutional problems, but never mind that for now).\(^{144}\) The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has statutory power to adjudicate those damages claims,\(^{145}\) much as the LHWCA allows federal officials to adjudicate claims for workers’ compensation. That falls into the “federal agency adjudication of federally defined and secured rights” category. The broker in Schor did not bother to challenge this grant of authority to the Agency, which is covered rather squarely by Crowell v. Benson and its successors.\(^{146}\) The Agency, however, also claimed authority to adjudicate counterclaims brought by the broker against the customer,\(^{147}\) which are likely to be state law–based contract claims (such as unpaid commissions from other transactions). Schor disputed the ability of Congress or the agency to commit disposition of those state law claims to federal executive actors subject to deferential rather than de novo review.\(^{148}\) The Court ruled in favor of the agency’s power to adjudicate the common-law counterclaims.\(^{149}\) The Court’s reasoning says everything one needs to know about the relationship between modern doctrine and original meaning.

The best way to grasp the Court’s reasoning in Schor is to look at what that reasoning was not—in much the fashion of the via negativa.\(^{150}\) Consider a list of considerations that the Schor Court said could not be used to decide the case:

“[O]ur precedents in this area do not admit of easy synthesis . . . .”\(^{151}\) So, traditional doctrinal analysis is unlikely to be a reliable guide to resolution of novel questions. That is fair. Would not one want to start with the constitutional text anyway, to try to figure out the scope of Article III’s vesting of “judicial Power” in good-behavior-tenured and salary-guaranteed judges rather than in executive officials?

Well, no: The precedents may not “admit of easy synthesis,” but “they do establish that the resolution of claims such as Schor’s cannot turn on conclusory reference to the language of Article III.”\(^{152}\) So, the language of the constitutional text is out.

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145 Id. § 18.
148 Id. at 838.
149 Id. at 851–58.
151 Schor, 478 U.S. at 847.
152 Id.
But surely the text must be understood in the context of the broader structural categories it represents. As noted earlier, the Constitution assumes a distinction among legislative, executive, and judicial powers. How about trying to apply those constitutionally fundamental categories of power to discern the proper lines of executive and judicial authority and thus flesh out the meaning of the constitutional language?

Well, no: “[P]ractical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III.”\(^\text{153}\) So, formal categories—such as “legislative Power[],” “executive Power,” and “judicial Power”—are out.

Hmm. How about if, in sorting through our “attention to substance,” we try to identify specific factors that, in any particular case, will tell us which substantive features are constitutionally relevant?

Well, no: “[I]n reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative . . . .”\(^\text{154}\) So, determinative factors are out.

Rules? No: “In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules.”\(^\text{155}\) No again: “bright-line rules cannot effectively be employed . . . .”\(^\text{156}\) So, rules are out.

If not rules, then how about principles of general application?

Well, no: The thing for which bright-line rules cannot effectively be employed to do is precisely “to yield broad principles applicable in all Article III inquiries.”\(^\text{157}\) So, broad general principles are also out.

But if we cannot use constitutional language, constitutional categories, determinative factors, rules, or general principles, how will we ever be able to formulate a coherent account of the permissible limits of executive adjudication of private rights?

Wrong question: “Although such rules might lend a greater degree of coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers.”\(^\text{158}\) Coherence, too, is out.

Of course, it is one thing to mock the modern Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. It is quite another to specify, as an original matter, the correct limits of executive adjudication. That task is made more complex by the fact that

\(^{153}\) Id. at 848 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985)).

\(^{154}\) Id. at 851.

\(^{155}\) Id.

\(^{156}\) Id. at 857.

\(^{157}\) Schor, 478 U.S. at 857.

\(^{158}\) Id. at 851. A search for the Needed and Innovative Action Clause in the Constitution came up blank.
non–Article III adjudication of private rights occurred long before Crowell v. Benson and the rise of the modern administrative state.159 Officials in federal territory, who did not have the characteristics of Article III judges, were deciding cases, including criminal cases (and including capital criminal cases) in the Northwest Territory, the Louisiana Territory after 1803, Florida after 1819, the District of Columbia, etc.160 One must not forget that William Marbury served under a five-year term of office, not under the protection of tenure during good behavior.161 Was William Marbury unconstitutionally deciding cases? Were all the ensuing territorial judges mere usurpers who, all without authority, determined private rights, put people in prison, and sent others to the gallows?162

The short answers are yes and yes. The long answer, taking account of all the developments since the founding—including the judicial approval of territorial courts163 and of administrative distress warrants issued against tax collectors164—would require a book, or at the very least a near-book-length article.165 For present purposes, it is enough to say that vested rights cannot be undone by executive (or legislative) action. It requires judicial process. That is what the idea of due process of law has been about at least since Magna Carta in the thirteenth century. The modern case law to the contrary is as far removed from the actual Constitution as is the modern case law

159 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 32, at 139–150.

160 See id.


162 Cf. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 522–23 (1857) (Catron, J., concurring) (“It is due to myself to say, that it is asking much of a judge, who has for nearly twenty years been exercising jurisdiction, from the western Missouri line to the Rocky Mountains, and, on this understanding of the Constitution [that Congress has power under Article IV to govern territories], inflicting the extreme penalty of death for crimes committed where the direct legislation of Congress was the only rule, to agree that he had been all the while acting in mistake, and as an usurper.”). Actually, territorial judges before 1801 do appear to have been given tenure during good behavior. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 32, at 238 n.5. After 1801, however, appointments for periods of fixed durations became the norm.

163 The seminal case is Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). The reduction ad absurdum of allowing non–Article III territorial courts to decide cases is Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), which allowed non–Article III courts in the District of Columbia to preside over criminal trials. For a critique of this line of authority, see Lawson & Seidman, supra note 32, at 139–50.

164 See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 274 (1856). For an assessment of Murray’s Lessee, including the suggestion that the result can constitutionally be justified only under a theory of waiver of due process rights upon accepting the position of collector, see Lawson, supra note 20, at 638–43.

allowing Congress to subdelegate its legislative power whenever the Court believes that such subdelegation is necessary to let Congress do its “job.”

The chief question under the AIA is whether the issuance of an invention patent creates a vested right. Questions of that kind are better left to patent experts, though the evidence for viewing issued patents as vested property rights appears to be overwhelming.

A more complicated question, raised by Professor Greg Reilly in a brilliant comment on an early draft of this Article and relied on by the Supreme Court in *Oil States*, is whether the substance of that vested right allows for the kind of cancellation authority contained in the AIA. Section 261 of Title 35 of the United States Code provides that “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.” As Professor Reilly pointed out, the patent laws at least since 1980, and quite possibly since 1952, have contained what might be thought of as “defeasibility conditions” for issued patents by prescribing various methods for administrative review of issued patents. The *inter partes* cancellation authority added in 2011 is considerably more powerful than those prior administrative mechanisms, but it is not clear that it is different in kind rather than merely different in degree. Perhaps it is different in kind if the pre-2011 administrative processes were in some sense voluntary, with their use by a patent holder amounting to a waiver of what would otherwise be a right to have cancellation performed only by a court. *Inter partes* review under the AIA can be thrust on an unwilling patent holder by a third party, so no argument from

166 E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). “And what, precisely, is Congress’s constitutional ‘job’? To regulate in a way and to a degree that is pleasing to the political sensibilities of a majority of the Supreme Court? One might think, looking at the Constitution, that Congress’s job is to legislate in accordance with the substantive and procedural norms prescribed by the Constitution.” Gary Lawson, *Representative/Senator Trump?*, 21 CHAPMAN L. REV. 111, 127 n.82 (2018).


170 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). The specification that patents shall be considered “personal property” may affect some of the available remedies for patents, and it might affect how patents pass upon death, but it does not affect any of the issues discussed in this Article. Due process of law applies to personal as well as to real property. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999).


173 For a brief history of the administrative processes for patent review, see Dolin, *supra* note 3, at 890–99.

waiver is available with respect to the AIA. But put aside that possibility and assume for the moment that all existing patents have been issued in light of some kind of involuntary administrative process for cancellation. Does section 261 make all of those patents subject to the proviso that they can be cancelled by administrative rather than judicial process, because inter partes review is now among the “provisions of this title”? Can Congress constitutionally specify by statute that all patents are defeasible in that manner?

Take the second question first. Congress arguably could make land grants defeasible. Some federal land is granted in fee simple, while other federal land is leased, often for oil, mineral, or forestry rights. There is no obvious constitutional obstacle to fashioning those leases as tenancies at will or for attaching defeasibility conditions with the proviso that executive rather than judicial actors get to determine whether those conditions have been satisfied. Could Congress do the same with patents?

The obvious difference is that the land leased out by the government (or granted in the form of a defeasible fee) actually belongs to the government, while the intellectual property rights represented by a patent do not. The Intellectual Property Clause says that Congress may pass laws “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The use of the term “securing” is significant in light of the Declaration of Independence, which announces that people are “endowed by their Creator”—not by their government, but by their Creator—“with certain unalienable Rights; [and] that among these are”—not exclusively consisting of, but including—“Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” It then announces that governments are instituted “to secure these rights.” The plain understanding of the Declaration is that those rights preexist government. They are, in that sense, natural or prepolitical. Professor Randy Barnett elegantly describes the political theory of the Declaration of Independence as “first comes rights and then comes government.” Does the use of the term “securing” in the Intellectual Property Clause cross-reference the use of the term “secure” in the Declaration? Does that mean that intellectual property rights are, for constitutional purposes, natural rights that Congress can (and, to fulfill its fiduciary obligations under the Intellectual Property Clause, must) protect in good faith? And would that good-faith protection foreclose the kind of defeasible patent interests reflected in the AIA?

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177 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
178 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
179 Id.
These are all questions well beyond the scope of this Article.\textsuperscript{181} Certainly, the case law does not treat intellectual property rights as natural rather than positive rights,\textsuperscript{182} but that does not say much about original meaning. To a newcomer to the field, it does not seem at all obvious that the Constitution does not treat intellectual property rights as natural rights.\textsuperscript{183} For the moment, however, let us assume that Congress could, if it so chose, make the cancellation of patents defeasible upon purely administrative action. Has it done so?

Obviously, it has done so in the AIA,\textsuperscript{184} so, on this reasoning, any patents issued after enactment of the AIA in 2011 would validly be subject to \textit{inter partes} review. That is the plain holding in \textit{Oil States},\textsuperscript{185} But what about patents issued prior to 2011—a matter on which the Supreme Court specifically reserved judgment in \textit{Oil States}?\textsuperscript{186} On this reasoning, they would be subject to whatever administrative mechanisms were in place \textit{at the time that the patents were issued}. Those mechanisms include reexamination, but they do not include the third-party-initiated \textit{inter partes} review added by the AIA. Just as defeasibility conditions in land grants are defined by the grant itself rather than by subsequent decisions by the grantor, the conditions on patents imposed by the statutory scheme for patent issuance are defined by the terms of the statute at the time of the grant. Venerable authority confirms this much.\textsuperscript{187} There is no way to save the AIA’s constitutionality for any patents issued prior to its enactment. Those patents can go through the administrative machinery in place when they were granted, but they cannot be channeled by subsequent legislation into a procedure employing a new defeasibility condition that was not part of the original grant.

II. INVALID APPOINTMENTS

Assume for the moment that administrative cancellation of patents is constitutionally permissible, at least in some circumstances. Does this mean that the AIA scheme is constitutional?

Not at all. Unless one applies some very dicey statutory interpretation to the AIA and interpolates a unilateral power in the Director (i.e., the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United

\textsuperscript{183} Whether intellectual property is, as a matter of moral fact, a proper subject of natural rights is a very different question. But constitutional meaning and moral fact are two quite separate things.
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Oil States}, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–74.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Id.} at 1379.
\textsuperscript{187} See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
States Patent and Trademark Office) to overturn decisions of PTAB panels, the scheme violates the Appointments Clause because it creates officials with the characteristics of principal officers who are appointed in a fashion appropriate for inferior officers.

The Appointments Clause provides that the President

shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.188

Thus, noninferior (or “principal”) officers must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, while inferior officers may—with statutory authorization—be appointed by the President alone, the courts of law, or department heads.189 If a government employee is not an “officer” at all, Congress can prescribe any mode of selection that is “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers, including selection through competitive civil service processes or appointment by an official who does not fit the description of any of the appointing authorities mentioned in the Appointments Clause. But if someone is a constitutional “Officer[] of the United States,” his or her appointment must fall within one of the modes prescribed by the Appointments Clause.190 If the appointing authority is neither the President, a court of law, nor a head of a department, the appointment of an officer is automatically invalid. And, as this paragraph began, if the officer is not an “inferior” officer, the only game in town is presidential appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate. Congress has no choice about that.

The functions performed by the PTAB, such as cancellation of patents, can be performed only by “Officers of the United States.”192 This became clear after a 1999 statute provided for appointment of the administrative patent judges of the PTAB’s predecessor, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), by the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office.193 Professor John Duffy pointed out that these appointments were unlawful unless either the judges were not “Officers of the United States” or the Director was among the “Heads of Departments” mentioned in the Appointments

188 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
189 In the absence of statutory authorization for appointment by one of these modes, the default rule for appointment of inferior officers is presidential appointment with senatorial advice and consent.
190 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
191 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
192 See Duffy, supra note 12, at 905-09.
Clause. It seemed clear to nearly everyone that the Director, who runs a subunit of the Department of Commerce and answers to the Secretary of Commerce, was not a constitutional department head. It was even more obvious that the BPAI judges were constitutional officers. The governing doctrinal test for officer status is whether the person exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” This test sweeps in special trial judges of the United States Tax Court and administrative law judges. It rather plainly includes administrative patent judges:

Administrative patent judges have much more authority than the [special trial] judges [of the Tax Court] at issue in Freytag. Like the special trial judges, administrative patent judges are officers “established by Law,” and they have more than ministerial duties under the statute . . . Indeed, they are not mere adjuncts or advisors to another set of adjudicators, as in Freytag. Rather, they are full members of the BPAI. Their powers include the ability to run trials, take evidence, rule on admissibility, and compel compliance with discovery orders.

A panel of three administrative patent judges may sit as the BPAI and is authorized by law to render final decisions for the PTO. Indeed, in interference cases, the statute expressly states that any BPAI decision adverse to an applicant shall constitute the “final refusal” by the PTO as to the claims involved. The finality of the BPAI’s decisions in ex parte appeals is implicit in the statutory scheme, which provides a right of appeal from any decision of the BPAI to the Article III courts. Furthermore, during judicial review of the BPAI’s decisions, Article III courts are required to afford the decisions of the BPAI a substantial degree of deference under the Administrative Procedure Act. The power to reach a final administrative decision—one that the courts are required to respect with deference—surely means that the members of the BPAI are exercising significant authority under the law and are thus officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause.

PTAB members have all of these powers, plus (assuming their validity) substantial powers under inter partes review, including the “significant authority” to cancel issued patents. It is even clearer that PTAB members are constitutional officers as a matter of original meaning, because the test of “significant authority” articulated in Buckley v. Valeo is likely too narrow and should include as an officer anyone “whom the government entrusts with

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194 See Duffy, supra note 12, at 904–05.
195 See id. at 910–11. The Director’s status may not be quite so easy a call, at least as a matter of first constitutional principles. A subunit of a department can be a department in its own right—as may be true, for example, of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), which is located within the structure of the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Gary Lawson, The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB Is Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73, 80 (2009). Perhaps the Patent Office has a sufficiently distinct identity to count as a constitutional “department” as well, and, as explained below, the PTAB itself is likely a “department,” in which case its head would be a proper appointing authority for inferior officers. That view, however, is not reflected in current doctrine.
196 See Duffy, supra note 12, at 907.
200 Duffy, supra note 12, at 907 (footnotes omitted).
201 See Gugliuzza, supra note 2, at 282.
ongoing responsibility to perform a statutory duty of any level of importance.” Under any applicable standard, it is unlikely that anyone would contest that PTAB members are “Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause. Congress evidently agreed with this conclusion, because, in the face of litigation that raised constitutional claims inspired by Professor Duffy’s work, Congress changed the appointment process for PTAB members to its current form, under which the administrative patent judges are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce.

That is not good enough. It solves the “Duffy Defect” on the assumption that the members of the PTAB are inferior officers who may be appointed by heads of departments, such as the Secretary of Commerce. But it does not solve the problem that arises when principal officers are appointed in a manner appropriate only for inferior officers. The members of the PTAB are quite probably principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Only one PTAB member—the Director—meets that criterion, and that arrangement does not meet the constitutional requirements given the decisionmaking structure for the PTAB set out by the statute, which requires decisions by three-person panels.

Doctrinally, the case law reflects two inconsistent tests for principal officer status. In *Morrison v. Olson*, the Court held 7–1, over a fierce dissent by Justice Scalia, that a special prosecutor was an inferior rather than a principal officer based on a multifactor inquiry that considered whether the officer “is subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official,” can “perform only certain, limited duties,” “is limited in jurisdiction,” and “is limited in tenure.” Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion focused on the fact that the special prosecutor was not subject to the direction and control of any other executive official. Justice Scalia wrote: “[I]t is not a sufficient condition for ‘inferior’ officer status that one be subordinate to a principal officer. . . . But it is surely a necessary condition for inferior officer status that the officer be subordinate to another officer.”

Nine years later, in *Edmond v. United States*, Justice Scalia’s dissenting view appeared to transform into a majority opinion. In finding that the

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204 See Duffy, supra note 12, at 916–19.
205 Scholars have taken to calling the Appointments Clause problem of inferior officers who are not appointed by proper authorities the “Duffy Defect.” E.g., Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying Which Government Workers Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (2011); John T. Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 201, 215–17 (2014).
207 Id. at 671–72.
208 Id. at 719–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 722 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Generally speaking, the term “inferior officer” connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an “inferior” officer depends on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that other officers may be identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude. If that were the intention, the Constitution might have used the phrase “lesser officer.” Rather, in the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important Government assignments, we think it evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.211

This inquiry focuses attention on the place of the officer within an executive hierarchy. On this reasoning, officers with final decisional authority (apart from the omnipresent authority of the President to overrule any executive official) are necessarily principal officers;212

The Court failed to resolve, or even acknowledge, this conflict in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board;213 which brusquely dismissed claims that the PCAOB members were principal officers: “Given that the [Securities and Exchange] Commission is properly viewed, under the Constitution, as possessing the power to remove Board members at will, and given the Commission’s other oversight authority, we have no hesitation in concluding that under Edmond the Board members are inferior officers . . . .”214

Methodologically, this admittedly modest doctrinal development seems to suggest that the inquiry prescribed in Edmond has prevailed and that a federal executive officer whose decision is final within the executive department but for review by the President is necessarily a principal officer. As a matter of original meaning, which is more to the point for this Article, that is definitely the right answer. Professor Steve Calabresi and the author of this Article have elsewhere made the argument to that effect at some length,215 Much of both Articles II and III deal with matters of organizational hierarchy, and the Appointments Clause is part of that structural machinery. The reference in the Appointments Clause to “Heads of Departments” as permissible appointing authorities for inferior officers reeks of hierarchy; hierarchically

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211 Id. at 662–63.
212 As Justice Scalia intimated in Morrison, officers who do not have that final authority might also be principal officers if their duties are sufficiently important within the structure of the executive department. That is why the Solicitor General might well be a principal officer, as might be the members of the PCAOB. See Lawson, supra note 195, at 77–80. Location within the executive hierarchy is one sure route to principal officer status, but it does not have to be the only route.
214 Id. at 510.
superior status is what it means to be the “Head” of a department.\textsuperscript{216} The Opinions Clause, with its reference to “the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,”\textsuperscript{217} reinforces this hierarchical account of executive institutions. And because a department is “any unit of government that has sufficient distinctness and authority to be viewed as a ‘Department[,]’”\textsuperscript{218} anyone with final decisional authority within the executive department is going to be among the “Heads of Departments,” who are “the principal Officer[s] in each of the executive Departments.” The Edmond inquiry is exactly the right one; to be an inferior officer, an officer’s decision must be subject to review by another executive official than the President.

Applying that inquiry to the PTAB, it seems clear that the PTAB members are given the functions of principal officers. Decisions of the PTAB get appealed directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.\textsuperscript{219} There is no higher level of review within the executive department. Decisions of PTAB panels can be reheard, but “[o]nly the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may grant rehearings.”\textsuperscript{220} Every determination by the PTAB must “be heard by at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, who shall be designated by the Director,”\textsuperscript{221} so only a three-member body of the PTAB itself (or perhaps only the entire PTAB en banc\textsuperscript{222}) can authorize a rehearing and thus review an otherwise final decision. The bottom line is that the PTAB is the final authority within the executive department (other than review by the President, which is always available under unitary executive theory, even for heads of departments) on

\textsuperscript{216} See id. at 1018–20.
\textsuperscript{217} U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
\textsuperscript{218} Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 215, at 1019 (alteration in original); see also Lawson, supra note 195, at 83–84.
\textsuperscript{220} Id. § 6(c).
\textsuperscript{221} Id.
\textsuperscript{222} See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he language of the last sentence of § 7(b) could be interpreted to mean that only all the members of the board acting together have authority to grant rehearings (and perhaps must also vote unanimously in order to decide the merits of the rehearing), or the statute could be interpreted to mean that only the members of the board who first heard the appeal have authority to grant rehearing. Or, if the ‘rehearing’ is considered to be a form of ‘appeal,’ the statute must be interpreted to mean that the Commissioner may designate members of the board who, acting together, are the only ones to have authority to grant rehearings and decide appeals.” (footnote omitted)). It seems pretty obvious, as an outsider to the patent world, that the statute unambiguously mandates that rehearings be authorized only by the full PTAB body rather than by three-judge panels selected by the Director. The statute plainly distinguishes the PTAB as a body from three-judge panels of that body, and the rehearing provision grants authority to the body itself. Four judges of the Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion with respect to the PTAB’s predecessor. See id. at 1575–76 (Mayer, J., dissenting); id. at 1583–85 (Schall, J., dissenting). But since panel selection authority is not decisional authority in any event, it does not matter to the present argument whether this Article and those dissenting judges are right about this point.
matters of substantive law. That is the very definition of a principal officer. Federal officers who exercise that kind of hierarchically final authority must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Constitution leaves no wiggle room on that front.

The only member of the PTAB appointed in the constitutionally proper fashion for principal officers is the Director. But because all PTAB decisions must be made by panels of at least three members, all decisions involve at least two people who are not appointed as principal officers. The Director’s ability to select the panels may give him or her some kind of practical influence over outcomes, but the Appointments Clause is not concerned about practical influence. It is a purposely formal provision. A panel of magistrates could not sit as a federal court of appeals simply because the chief judge of the circuit picked the panels. Regardless of how the panels are selected, if the panels consist of inferior officers but are performing functions that can be carried out only by principal officers, such as issuing unreviewable final decisions within the executive department, it is a constitutional violation.

Professor Duffy anticipated and contested this position with respect to the BPAI, the PTAB’s predecessor: “The PTO Director’s powers to select BPAI panels and to designate certain BPAI opinions as precedential help to explain why administrative patent judges may be considered ‘inferior’ and not principal officers, for the judges are inferior and subordinate in significant ways to the PTO Director.” Although disagreeing with Professor Duffy about anything, especially anything related to the PTO, is generally a path to error, he is wrong here. First, as explained above, functional powers to select panels or precedential opinions do not substitute for a power to review decisions. In whatever way the panels are selected, and whatever the internal precedential force of the opinions may be, the fact remains that these panels of persons appointed in a manner appropriate only for inferior officers are making final executive department determinations. The power to pick the panels is not the power to decide. Second, Professor Duffy’s analysis might (or might not—who can tell?) be an accurate application of the all-things-considered balancing test of Morrison, which he cited, but it does not address the hierarchical concerns of Edmond, which he did not cite. And Edmond rather than Morrison has much the better of the constitutional argument about what makes an officer a principal officer. The principal/inferior distinction is primarily, even if not exclusively, about hierarchy, and PTAB judges stand beneath only the President in the executive hierarchy.

The Supreme Court’s brief decision in Free Enterprise Fund that members of the PCAOB were inferior rather than principal officers rested in part

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223 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(c), 141, 319.
225 Duffy, supra note 12, at 908 n.21 (citation omitted) (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–73 (1988)).
on the Court’s holding that PCAOB members had to be removable at will by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The same reasoning was applied by the D.C. Circuit in *Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board*, which held that the judges of the Copyright Royalty Board had to be removable at will by the Librarian of Congress. The plaintiffs objected to the Copyright Royalty Board on much the same grounds as advanced in this Article against the PTAB: the officers on that body are appointed in a fashion appropriate for inferior officers, but they exercise decisionmaking power that is properly exercised only by principal officers. The organic statute for the Copyright Royalty Board provides that the Librarian could remove Board judges “for violation of the standards of conduct adopted under subsection (h), misconduct, neglect of duty, or any disqualifying physical or mental disability.” Following the holding in *Free Enterprise Fund*, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the for-cause removal provision indeed gave the Board judges so much independence that they had to be principal officers, but that the defect could be cured by severing the for-cause removal provision from the rest of the statute. If the Board judges were removable at will by the Librarian, said the court, then those judges could properly be considered inferior officers:

[S]evering the restrictions on the Librarian’s ability to remove the CRJs eliminates the Appointments Clause violation and minimizes any collateral damage. Specifically, we find unconstitutional all of the language . . . following “The Librarian of Congress may sanction or remove a Copyright Royalty Judge . . . .” Without this restriction, we are confident that (so long as the Librarian is a Head of Department, which we address below) the CRJs will be inferior rather than principal officers. With unfettered removal power, the Librarian will have the direct ability to “direct,” “supervise,” and exert some “control” over the Judges’ decisions. Although individual CRJ decisions will still not be directly reversible, the Librarian would be free to provide substantive input on non-factual issues via the Register, whom the Judges are free to consult, 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(a)(i). This, coupled with the threat of removal satisfies us that the CRJs’ decisions will be constrained to a significant degree by a principal officer (the Librarian). We further conclude that free removability constrains their power enough to outweigh the extent to which the scope of their duties exceeds that of the special counsel in *Morrison*. Cf. [Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010)] (“Given that the [SEC] is properly viewed, under the Constitution, as possessing the power to remove Board members at will, and given the Commission’s other oversight

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227 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012). I am grateful, as with many things, to Professor John Duffy for reminding me of this case, which I had neglected to discuss in my first draft (even though I include it in my casebook, for goodness’s sake).
228 Id. at 1341–42. The plaintiffs in *Intercollegiate Broadcasting System* further contended that the Librarian of Congress was not a department head and thus could not properly appoint even inferior officers. Id. at 1335. The D.C. Circuit rejected that claim. Id. at 1341–42. No one doubts that the Secretary of Commerce is a department head, so no such issue is raised with the PTAB.
230 *Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc.*, 684 F.3d at 1340–41 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting 17 U.S.C. § 802(i); then quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1997)).
authority, we have no hesitation in concluding that under Edmond the [PCAOB] members are inferior officers . . . .”). 231

Could the same reasoning sustain the PTAB, especially since there is no provision in the statute creating the PTAB limiting the removability of PTAB members?

The reasoning could sustain the PTAB if the reasoning was sound, but it is not sound. An officer’s status as a principal rather than inferior officer does not depend on whether the officer is removable by a higher authority but, rather, on whether the officer’s decisions are subject to review and revision by a higher authority. 232 Suppose that a panel of three administrative patent judges issues a decision that the Secretary of Commerce does not like. The Secretary, presumably, can fire all three judges. But what then happens to the decision that those judges made? It is still a valid decision of the PTAB until the case is reheard by another panel (or the full PTAB) and another decision issues. The firing of the judges does not, in itself, vacate their decision. The power to remove an officer is a functional, not a formal, power of control, as long as the removal of the officer does not automatically annul the officer’s decisions. And functional rather than formal powers of control are not what the Constitution is about. This is the same reason why the theory of the unitary executive does not lead to a constitutionally grounded presidential removal power but instead to a presidential power to veto actions of subordinates with which the President disagrees:

No modern judicial decision specifically addresses the President’s power either directly to make all discretionary decisions within the executive department or to nullify the actions of insubordinate subordinates. Instead, debate has focused almost exclusively on whether and when the President must have unlimited power to remove subordinate executive officials. That is an interesting and important question, but it does not address the central issue concerning the executive power. Even if the President has a constitutionally unlimited power to remove certain executive officials, that power alone does not satisfy the Article II Vesting Clause. If an official exercises power contrary to the President’s directives and is then removed, one must still determine whether the official’s exercise of power is legally valid. If the answer is “no,” then the President necessarily has the power to nullify discretionary actions of subordinates, and removal is therefore not the President’s sole power of control. If the answer is “yes,” then the insubordinate ex-official will have effectively exercised executive power contrary to the President’s wishes, which contravenes the vesting of that power in the President. A presidential removal power, even an unlimited removal power, is thus either constitutionally superfluous or constitutionally inadequate. 233

231 Id. at 1340–41.
232 See id. at 1340.
233 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1244 (1994) (footnote omitted). There may in fact be a constitutionally grounded presidential power of removal, but it must be located in the nature of the “executive Power” rather than in inferences from the unitary character of that power. This Article is officially agnostic on whether such a removal power exists. Even if it exists, however, the unitary character of the executive power further requires a presidential veto over actions of subordinates.
Analogously, a power to fire administrative law judges does not constitute
the kind of formal control over their decisions that makes them inferior rather
than principal officers. If their decisions are the final (nonpresidential) word
on the exercise of executive power, they are principal officers and must be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. If the
Supreme Court thought otherwise in *Free Enterprise Fund*, the Supreme
Court was mistaken.

The only way out of this involves some fancy statutory interpolation.
The Director of the PTO is properly appointed as a principal officer. If the
Director has ultimate decisional authority within the PTO, then the statutory
scheme is fine, because the PTAB will not really be the final executive deci-

sionmaker. One might try to infer such authority in the Director from the
provisions stating that “[t]he powers and duties of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office shall be vested in an Under Secretary of Commerce
for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trad-
mark Office (in this title referred to as the ‘Director’)” and that “[t]he Direc-
tor shall be responsible for providing policy direction and management su-

pervision for the Office and for the issuance of patents and the registration of
trademarks.”234 If the powers of the PTAB are really powers of the PTO itself,
then perhaps these provisions vest that power in the Director personally. On
this reasoning, the Director could unilaterally overturn any decision of the
PTAB, which would satisfy the Constitution by placing formal decisional
authority in the hands of a properly appointed principal officer.

The Federal Circuit, in a sharply divided en banc decision in 1994, used
similar reasoning under a slightly different statute235 to find that the Director’s
predecessor had authority to create a stacked, eight-person panel to recon-
sider a decision on a patent application issued by a three-person panel of the

BPAI:

Moreover, the Commissioner is not bound by a Board decision that an applicant is entitled to
a patent. Only a court can order the Commissioner to act, not the Board. Even though Board
members serve an essential function, they are but examiner-employees of the PTO, and the
ultimate authority regarding the granting of patents lies with the Commissioner. For example,
if the Board rejects an application, the Commissioner can control the PTO’s position in any
appeal through the Solicitor of the PTO; the Board cannot demand that the Solicitor attempt
to sustain the Board’s position. Conversely, if the Board approves an application, the Com-
missioner has the option of refusing to sign a patent; an action which would be subject to a
mandamus action by the applicant. The Commissioner has an obligation to refuse to grant a
patent if he believes that doing so would be contrary to law. The foregoing evidences that the
Board is merely the highest level of the Examining Corps, and like all other members of the

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235 See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988) (“The Commissioner, under the direction of the Secretary of Com-
merce, shall superintend or perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of pa-
tents . . . .”).
Examining Corps, the Board operates subject to the Commissioner’s overall ultimate authority and responsibility.\footnote{236}

If the PTAB is similarly “merely the highest level of the Examining Corps” and therefore “subject to the Commissioner’s [or Director’s] overall ultimate authority and responsibility,”\footnote{237} the constitutional problem is solved. The Director would not need to order rehearings to overturn PTAB rulings with which he or she disagreed. The Director could just enter the “correct” ruling and be done with it.

This interpretation of the statute finds some modest support in the first sentence of the provision creating the PTAB: “There shall be \textit{in the [Patent and Trademark] Office a Patent Trial and Appeal Board.}”\footnote{238} If the PTAB is “in” the PTO, and if all PTO functions are vested in the Director, then all PTAB functions are vested in the Director. One can further note the language of the provision requiring the PTAB to act in three-person panels, which at first glance is a structure that seems to counsel strongly against the ability of the Director to exercise the functions of the Board while acting as a single person. That provision says that “[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review shall be \textit{heard} by at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”\footnote{239} It does not say that everything must be \textit{decided} by three-person-or-larger panels, thus leaving room for decisional authority in the single person of the Director.

This seems too clever by half. The same statute that creates the PTAB also defines it to consist of “[t]he Director, the Deputy Director, the Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and the administrative patent judges.”\footnote{240} If the Director can simply decide any and all cases without reference to the PTAB, it is hard to see why the statute would bother to make the Director just one of the many people on the PTAB—and then to make clear that the Director, as with anyone else, can hear cases (a term of art that, when one is not being too clever by half, surely includes deciding as well as presiding) as part of a panel of at least three members. Under the principle that specific statutory provisions control general ones,\footnote{241} the specific delineation of the Director’s role with respect to the PTAB makes it unlikely that the Director also has a general authority unilaterally to exercise all the PTAB’s functions. Not impossible, perhaps, but unlikely.

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{236}{In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (footnotes omitted).}
\item \footnote{237}{Id.}
\item \footnote{238}{35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (emphasis added).}
\item \footnote{239}{Id. § 6(c) (emphasis added).}
\item \footnote{240}{Id. § 6(a).}
\item \footnote{241}{See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, \textsc{Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts} 183–88 (2012) (“If there is a conflict between a general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails (\textit{generalia specialibus non derogant}).”)}
\end{itemize}}
In the absence of statutory machinations along these lines, the Constitution does not allow the PTAB, as it is presently constituted, to exercise the final decisional authority vested in it by the statute.

CONCLUSION

The evident goal of the AIA was to provide more effective mechanisms for invalidating, or cancelling, already-issued patents. The Constitution, however, is not designed to maximize effectiveness. As the Supreme Court famously said in INS v. Chadha,242 “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”243 The AIA suffers from two serious constitutional defects. First, executive agents, such as the PTAB members, cannot cancel vested patent rights, because such action deprives patentholders of property “without due process of law.” As an original matter, due process of law requires judicial action for a deprivation of vested rights. Perhaps one can apply the inter partes mechanism to patents granted after enactment of the AIA in 2011 if one views application of this mechanism as a “defeasibility condition” built into the patent grants, but that condition did not exist for patents issued prior to 2011. Second, all but one of the PTAB officials who adjudicate patent validity are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce in a fashion appropriate for inferior officers of the United States. But the decisions of the PTAB, which by statute take place in panels of three officers, are the final word within the executive department. Any executive actor who issues final decisions on behalf of the United States is constitutionally a principal rather than inferior officer and must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Accordingly, all the PTAB members, and not merely the Director of the PTO, must be appointed as principal officers for the PTAB to perform its statutory function.

In enacting the AIA, Congress may have solved the “Duffy defect” by treating all PTAB members as officers of the United States. But there are still miles to go before the Constitution sleeps.

243 Id. at 944.